AI Analysis
Machine-generated analysis of the post above on 2026-10-18. Not written by the author of the post.
The post defends declining to sign a Russia-related "document", most likely the Senate-passed sanctions bill, with three loosely connected rationales and a claim of sole control: "I can sign it later, or any time that I want!" Russia is idealized as restrained toward Iran and as generously "sending, at a low price, millions of barrels of diesel to the World." Zelenskyy is blamed for American farmers' fuel costs and given a money motive for prolonging the war, which reverses victim and aggressor. The post closes by listing Ukraine's losses, ending with a "male population... low, wounded, and/or dead", as bargaining leverage and without sympathy, consistent with the empathy deficit in the narcissistic cluster. Displacement of a domestic economic grievance onto a foreign leader in a midterm season, splitting between Russia and Ukraine, and DARVO structure are the main defenses. Authorship markers (a dropped word in "I WANT THIS WAR END!", misplaced \"foolishly\", topic drift) point to his own hand despite the afternoon timestamp. Language is within his long-run baseline. "His oceans and seas are gone" is false (Ukraine holds its Odesa coast) and reads as hyperbole, not a cognitive slip.
- Dropped word in the all-caps climax: "I WANT THIS WAR END!"
- Awkward adverb placement: "drive, foolishly, Russia away"
- Topic drift: sanctions, then Iran, then diesel, then Ukrainian casualties, with no return to the opening point
- Signature closing "Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP"
- Idiosyncratic capitalization (Peace, Diesel Refineries, World)
Strongest facet: Low agreeableness (low tender-mindedness toward Ukrainian casualties)
Primary drive: power
Trigger: Narcissistic Injury — Criticism (Apparent pressure over not signing Russia sanctions legislation (inferred; the document is unnamed))
Rage: Intensity 40% targeting Volodymyr Zelenskyy
None
- Victim-offender reversal: the invaded country's leader "doesn't want to end this war, and probably never did"
- Aggressor recast as benefactor: Russia "sending, at a low price, millions of barrels of diesel to the World"
- Domestic fuel costs attributed to Ukraine rather than to broader market drivers
- "his oceans and seas are gone" despite Ukraine retaining its Black Sea coast
- Russia framed as restrained and generous while prosecuting the war
Ukraine has run a sustained long-range drone campaign against Russian oil refineries since 2024, widened through 2025, as part of its stated strategy to cut Russian fuel revenue.
The strikes are a real and large cause of the 2026 diesel squeeze, but they aren't the biggest one, and the post leaves out the Iran war. Ukrainian drones hit a Russian refinery about once every three days in the first eight months of 2026. Reuters reported Russian refining fell to 3.6 million b/d in July, the lowest since 2002, and the IEA estimates Russian diesel output fell nearly 30%. Russia banned diesel exports on July 8, 2026 (Moscow Times, CNN) and extended the ban through Oct. 31. S&P Global puts Russian diesel exports at about 140,000 b/d in July to September, against about 693,000 b/d a year earlier. The IEA's October 2026 Oil Market Report says combined Russian and Middle Eastern diesel/gasoil net exports fell 1.3 million b/d year on year, cutting global diesel exports by about 700,000 b/d. It ties the Russian slump to drone damage at refineries. Gulf diesel exports fell from about 1.4 million b/d to about 670,000 b/d, so the Hormuz disruption is the larger share, with Russia roughly 40%. The US effect is real too. EIA recorded a record $6.29/gal on Sept. 14 and AAA a record $6.53 on Sept. 22, against about $3.68 a year earlier. Truck Trucking News said Ukraine's strikes 'played a key role in pushing up global diesel prices this year,' alongside the Hormuz curbs. Fortune said truckers, ranchers and farmers were hard hit. But Zelenskyy, Time and Wikipedia's account all name the Iran war as the main or larger driver, and US refiners exporting at near-record pace also drained US stocks. The core claim holds, but it is one-sided: the larger cause, a war the US is fighting, goes unmentioned.
Russia is one of the world's largest diesel exporters, so cumulative volumes in the millions of barrels are accurate. The framing as a low-price service to the world leaves out that Russia restricted fuel exports in 2025 after refinery damage, and that discounted sales reflect sanctions, not generosity.
US intelligence assessments and wide reporting contradict this. Reuters (Oct. 13, 2026), citing two people briefed, said recent US intelligence found Russia and China giving Iran military support, including satellite imagery for targeting and weapons components. Reuters framed Trump's 'very low level' post as contradicting that intelligence. Bloomberg (Oct. 9), citing Western officials, reported Russia is supplying missiles to rebuild Iran's arsenal. The White House rejected that assessment. NBC News (July 31) reported Russia sharing electronic and satellite intelligence that likely helps Iran pinpoint US forces or jam US weapons. The Soufan Center (Oct. 16) cites CNN orbital tracking of Russian satellites over Prince Sultan Air Base before an Iranian strike that destroyed an AWACS. It also notes an FT report on Russian help since 2023 with a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. Early-war reporting (Washington Post, CNN, March 2026) described real-time Russian data on US ships and aircraft. Wikipedia's summary adds that Western intelligence assessed Russia resupplied Iran to about three-quarters of its prewar missile stock during the June ceasefire. One part of the claim holds: Russia hasn't sent troops and calibrates its help to protect ties with Washington and the Gulf. Soufan reports Putin weighs the risk to sanctions relief, which fits the 'compared to what they could be doing' hedge. Much of the reporting rests on anonymous officials, and the Kremlin denies it. Still, the weight of credible evidence, including the US government's own intelligence, says the help is substantial, not 'very little, if anything.'
European governments and EU institutions together are Ukraine's largest aid donors, and the Biden administration and Congress appropriated roughly $175 billion in Ukraine-related aid. The aid went to the Ukrainian state, largely as weapons and budget support, not to Zelenskyy personally.
Russia occupies roughly a fifth of Ukraine's internationally recognized territory, including Crimea and parts of four eastern and southern oblasts.
Ukraine has no ocean coastline. It lost its Sea of Azov coast but keeps its Black Sea coast around Odesa and Mykolaiv, and its Black Sea shipping corridor has operated since 2023.
Ukraine has taken very heavy military casualties and has had documented mobilization shortfalls. Describing the national male population as depleted in this way is hyperbole.
This is a counterfactual, but the record cuts against it. Two years before the post is autumn 2024, under Biden, when no US-brokered talks existed. The only Russian terms on record are Putin's of June 14, 2024. They required Ukraine to withdraw from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts within their full borders, including Zaporizhzhia city, which Kyiv still holds. They also required Ukraine to renounce NATO and called for lifting Western sanctions (AP/PBS, Euronews, Moscow Times). Kyiv called that capitulation. Russia's 2025 and 2026 demands centered on the rest of Donbas instead. In February 2026 Bloomberg reported Russia might give back occupied parts of Sumy, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. In July 2026 Bloomberg reported Russia had hardened and no longer intends to return any land. Either way, the 2024 terms were not clearly better. On the ground, Russia gained about 4,168 sq km in 2024 and about 4,984 sq km in 2025 (ISW). Since October 2024 that is roughly 1% of Ukraine, a bit more land lost under a frozen-line deal. But 2026 net gains were only about 145 sq km through September, and ISW recorded net Russian losses after Sept. 1 as Ukraine's 2026 counteroffensive retook ground. The US-European plan now discussed would freeze the current line with Article 5-style guarantees (Washington Post via Meduza). That is arguably a better offer than anything on the table in 2024. On the evidence, the claim is speculation, and mostly against the record.
Reporting on and just before the post date shows the talks stalled on Russia's side. Putin and Trump spoke on Oct. 9. Kremlin aide Ushakov said Putin 'categorically' ruled out resuming peace talks and vowed to fight until Russia's aims are met, blaming Ukrainian drone strikes (Ukrainska Pravda, US News/Reuters, Kyiv Post). The Washington Post (via Meduza) reported that Witkoff and Kushner themselves said Putin isn't ready to negotiate. A Reuters source close to the Kremlin said Putin will return only after capturing the rest of Donbas. Rubio called the war a 'dangerous stalemate.' Trump's Oct. 11 'energy ceasefire' wasn't confirmed by the Kremlin, which said only 'contacts are ongoing,' and Russian strikes on energy sites continued within hours (Fortune, CNN). NBC's Oct. 18 report said talks 'have effectively stalled.' There is some US activity. A US-Ukraine-European meeting in Miami on Oct. 9 was called 'productive' but produced no agreements, and Russia wasn't there. On Oct. 18 Zelenskyy spoke with Witkoff and Kushner about a possible meeting, with no date or venue set. On hostages, Trump named John Coale special envoy for hostage affairs on Oct. 4. The Atlantic reported Trump backed Coale's plan to ease sanctions in exchange for freed political prisoners. The Kremlin denied any such talks on Sept. 30 but confirmed routine security-service contact on swaps. The last American freed was Robert Gilman in August 2026, and no Ukraine-Russia POW exchange was found for October. The claim of 'great progress,' hostage talks included, isn't supported by any public record.
First, a correction to the first-pass context: the 'document' is not an unsigned bill. Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on Sept. 18, 2026, after the Senate passed it 86-11 on Aug. 7 and the House 262-159 on Sept. 16. On Oct. 16 he signed an executive order waiving its new sanctions and tariffs two days before they took effect, using the act's national-interest certification. 'Signing that document' most plausibly means putting those sanctions into force. The White House said enforcing them 'would impede ongoing U.S. efforts to negotiate' and that the president 'retains the ability to exercise these authorities at any time,' which matches 'I can sign it later' (Time, Euronews, NBC). The prediction itself can't be tested, since the sanctions were waived, but the evidence cuts against it. Russia had already stepped away from the table without them: Putin ruled out resuming talks on Oct. 9, citing drone strikes, not sanctions. Witkoff and Kushner said Putin isn't ready to negotiate, and a Reuters source said he'll return only after taking the rest of Donbas. Signing the act itself on Sept. 18 didn't pull Russia out of talks either. Precedent also points the other way. The Oct. 22, 2025 sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil were followed within days by Dmitriev's Miami talks with Witkoff, which produced the 28-point plan (Axios, CTV). On the other side, Putin envoy Dmitriev called the waiver 'truly historic' and said the package could have stalled US-Russia economic cooperation, so Moscow did weigh it. The forecast is not well supported.
No contradictions with other posts detected yet.
Trump spent a Sunday mostly on foreign affairs. The standout was an open letter endorsing Benjamin Netanyahu nine days before Israel's election, which warned that if anyone else won, America was "not inclined" to finish the job against Iran on its own. Hours later he posted Netanyahu's video thankin...
Three reasons offered for a decision called "very simple"
The post opens with "My decision on Russia is a very simple one" and then gives three separate justifications: the peace talks, keeping Russia away from Iran, and Zelenskyy's refinery strikes. The "document" he declines to sign is not named. The likeliest referent is the Russia sanctions legislation the Senate passed 86-11 in August 2026, which would let the president tariff buyers of Russian energy. That reading is an inference from the timeline, since the post never names the bill. A decision that needs three rationales, each from a different policy area, and then ends in a personal attack on a third party, reads as a justification written for an audience that has already objected. The phrase "unless stupid people get in the way" points at that audience without naming it, most plausibly the legislators or commentators pushing him to sign.
Discretion as the real argument
The sentence carrying the most psychological weight is "I can sign it later, or any time that I want!" It is an autonomy claim, and it changes what the post is about: the subject is less the merits of sanctions than his sole control over their timing. This fits a high agency, low communion profile, where the decision belongs to one person and other actors are mainly obstacles ("stupid people"). The framing of Russia is also notable. Signing would "drive, foolishly, Russia away", Russia is doing "very little, if anything" to help Iran, and Russia is "nevertheless, sending, at a low price, millions of barrels of diesel to the World." Each mention of Russia is either neutral or credits it with restraint or generosity, the aggressor's side of an idealization/devaluation split.
Moving the diesel grievance onto Zelenskyy
The second half shifts blame. Domestic economic pain ("Farmers, ranchers, and businesses of all kinds are suffering greatly") is pinned on Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries, not on wider fuel-market pressures. Those pressures plausibly include the US conflict with Iran that the same-day Netanyahu post refers to. This is displacement: a grievance with domestic political cost goes to a foreign target who can't vote in the midterms the rally schedule is built around. The structure is also DARVO-shaped. The invaded country's leader "doesn't want to end this war, and probably never did," while the invading country's export policy is described as a kindness to the world. The motive he gives Zelenskyy, "all of the money that Europe is famously giving him, and that Crooked Joe Biden gave him", turns aid into personal gain and slips in a reflexive Biden epithet. Assigning a greed motive to someone else is projection in form, though one post can't establish where the motive actually lives.
The casualty inventory
"His country is in shambles, a large portion of his land is lost, his oceans and seas are gone, and his male population is low, wounded, and/or dead." The list builds to the dead and offers no sympathy. It works as leverage ("he could have made a better deal two years ago"), with Ukrainian losses cited as proof of Zelenskyy's weak bargaining position. The flat tone toward mass casualties fits the lack-of-empathy criterion in the narcissistic cluster. Whether there is pleasure in it, the sadism marker, is not clear from the text. The tone is contemptuous, not gleeful, so the sadism score stays low.
Voice and errors
The timestamp converts to about 4:36 PM Eastern on a Sunday. That is ordinary daytime and on its own would lean toward staff, but the text overrides it. "Drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table" puts an adverb in a place an editor would move. "I WANT THIS WAR END!" drops a word inside the all-caps climax. The thread moves from sanctions to Iran, then to diesel, then to Ukraine's male population, without closing the first point. The capitalized "Peace", "Diesel Refineries" and "World" and the closing "Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP" are his standard 2025-26 signature. Set against the same day's golf-course announcements ("We would like to thank Tom Fazio for his initial conceptual design"), which read as drafted, this post shows the drift and errors those lack.
On cognition, the dropped "to" and "his oceans and seas are gone" (Ukraine has no ocean, and still holds its Odesa coastline) are the only candidates. The first matches word omissions that run through his writing over many years. The second is better read as hyperbole than as a substitution error. Neither departs from baseline in any meaningful way.
What the post does not do
The post names no target for action and contains no mobilizing language. Its harm lies in the reality claims, not in incitement. The aggressor in the war is presented as restrained and generous, and the defending side as the obstacle to peace. Followers are asked to accept that framing to make sense of a decision not to sanction Russia.
Fact Verification
| Claim | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| "Zelenskyy is using diesel refineries in Russia as a target" | True | Ukraine has run a sustained long-range drone campaign against Russian oil refineries since 2024, widened through 2025, as part of its stated strategy to cut Russian fuel revenue. |
| "Ukraine's refinery attacks are seriously hurting world diesel markets, including in the United States" | Mostly True | The strikes are a real and large cause of the 2026 diesel squeeze, but they aren't the biggest one, and the post leaves out the Iran war. Ukrainian drones hit a Russian refinery about once every three days in the first eight months of 2026. Reuters reported Russian refining fell to 3.6 million b/d in July, the lowest since 2002, and the IEA estimates Russian diesel output fell nearly 30%. Russia banned diesel exports on July 8, 2026 (Moscow Times, CNN) and extended the ban through Oct. 31. S&P Global puts Russian diesel exports at about 140,000 b/d in July to September, against about 693,000 b/d a year earlier. The IEA's October 2026 Oil Market Report says combined Russian and Middle Eastern diesel/gasoil net exports fell 1.3 million b/d year on year, cutting global diesel exports by about 700,000 b/d. It ties the Russian slump to drone damage at refineries. Gulf diesel exports fell from about 1.4 million b/d to about 670,000 b/d, so the Hormuz disruption is the larger share, with Russia roughly 40%. The US effect is real too. EIA recorded a record $6.29/gal on Sept. 14 and AAA a record $6.53 on Sept. 22, against about $3.68 a year earlier. Truck Trucking News said Ukraine's strikes 'played a key role in pushing up global diesel prices this year,' alongside the Hormuz curbs. Fortune said truckers, ranchers and farmers were hard hit. But Zelenskyy, Time and Wikipedia's account all name the Iran war as the main or larger driver, and US refiners exporting at near-record pace also drained US stocks. The core claim holds, but it is one-sided: the larger cause, a war the US is fighting, goes unmentioned. |
| "Russia is sending, at a low price, millions of barrels of diesel to the world" | Half True | Russia is one of the world's largest diesel exporters, so cumulative volumes in the millions of barrels are accurate. The framing as a low-price service to the world leaves out that Russia restricted fuel exports in 2025 after refinery damage, and that discounted sales reflect sanctions, not generosity. |
| "Russia is doing very little, if anything, to help the Islamic Republic of Iran" | Mostly False | US intelligence assessments and wide reporting contradict this. Reuters (Oct. 13, 2026), citing two people briefed, said recent US intelligence found Russia and China giving Iran military support, including satellite imagery for targeting and weapons components. Reuters framed Trump's 'very low level' post as contradicting that intelligence. Bloomberg (Oct. 9), citing Western officials, reported Russia is supplying missiles to rebuild Iran's arsenal. The White House rejected that assessment. NBC News (July 31) reported Russia sharing electronic and satellite intelligence that likely helps Iran pinpoint US forces or jam US weapons. The Soufan Center (Oct. 16) cites CNN orbital tracking of Russian satellites over Prince Sultan Air Base before an Iranian strike that destroyed an AWACS. It also notes an FT report on Russian help since 2023 with a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. Early-war reporting (Washington Post, CNN, March 2026) described real-time Russian data on US ships and aircraft. Wikipedia's summary adds that Western intelligence assessed Russia resupplied Iran to about three-quarters of its prewar missile stock during the June ceasefire. One part of the claim holds: Russia hasn't sent troops and calibrates its help to protect ties with Washington and the Gulf. Soufan reports Putin weighs the risk to sanctions relief, which fits the 'compared to what they could be doing' hedge. Much of the reporting rests on anonymous officials, and the Kremlin denies it. Still, the weight of credible evidence, including the US government's own intelligence, says the help is substantial, not 'very little, if anything.' |
| "Europe is giving Zelenskyy large sums of money, and Biden gave him money in the past" | Mostly True | European governments and EU institutions together are Ukraine's largest aid donors, and the Biden administration and Congress appropriated roughly $175 billion in Ukraine-related aid. The aid went to the Ukrainian state, largely as weapons and budget support, not to Zelenskyy personally. |
| "A large portion of Ukraine's land is lost" | True | Russia occupies roughly a fifth of Ukraine's internationally recognized territory, including Crimea and parts of four eastern and southern oblasts. |
| "Ukraine's oceans and seas are gone" | False | Ukraine has no ocean coastline. It lost its Sea of Azov coast but keeps its Black Sea coast around Odesa and Mykolaiv, and its Black Sea shipping corridor has operated since 2023. |
| "Ukraine's male population is low, wounded, and/or dead" | Half True | Ukraine has taken very heavy military casualties and has had documented mobilization shortfalls. Describing the national male population as depleted in this way is hyperbole. |
| "Zelenskyy could have made a better deal two years ago" | Mostly False | This is a counterfactual, but the record cuts against it. Two years before the post is autumn 2024, under Biden, when no US-brokered talks existed. The only Russian terms on record are Putin's of June 14, 2024. They required Ukraine to withdraw from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts within their full borders, including Zaporizhzhia city, which Kyiv still holds. They also required Ukraine to renounce NATO and called for lifting Western sanctions (AP/PBS, Euronews, Moscow Times). Kyiv called that capitulation. Russia's 2025 and 2026 demands centered on the rest of Donbas instead. In February 2026 Bloomberg reported Russia might give back occupied parts of Sumy, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. In July 2026 Bloomberg reported Russia had hardened and no longer intends to return any land. Either way, the 2024 terms were not clearly better. On the ground, Russia gained about 4,168 sq km in 2024 and about 4,984 sq km in 2025 (ISW). Since October 2024 that is roughly 1% of Ukraine, a bit more land lost under a frozen-line deal. But 2026 net gains were only about 145 sq km through September, and ISW recorded net Russian losses after Sept. 1 as Ukraine's 2026 counteroffensive retook ground. The US-European plan now discussed would freeze the current line with Article 5-style guarantees (Washington Post via Meduza). That is arguably a better offer than anything on the table in 2024. On the evidence, the claim is speculation, and mostly against the record. |
| "Great progress is being made in peace negotiations, including hostage negotiations" | Mostly False | Reporting on and just before the post date shows the talks stalled on Russia's side. Putin and Trump spoke on Oct. 9. Kremlin aide Ushakov said Putin 'categorically' ruled out resuming peace talks and vowed to fight until Russia's aims are met, blaming Ukrainian drone strikes (Ukrainska Pravda, US News/Reuters, Kyiv Post). The Washington Post (via Meduza) reported that Witkoff and Kushner themselves said Putin isn't ready to negotiate. A Reuters source close to the Kremlin said Putin will return only after capturing the rest of Donbas. Rubio called the war a 'dangerous stalemate.' Trump's Oct. 11 'energy ceasefire' wasn't confirmed by the Kremlin, which said only 'contacts are ongoing,' and Russian strikes on energy sites continued within hours (Fortune, CNN). NBC's Oct. 18 report said talks 'have effectively stalled.' There is some US activity. A US-Ukraine-European meeting in Miami on Oct. 9 was called 'productive' but produced no agreements, and Russia wasn't there. On Oct. 18 Zelenskyy spoke with Witkoff and Kushner about a possible meeting, with no date or venue set. On hostages, Trump named John Coale special envoy for hostage affairs on Oct. 4. The Atlantic reported Trump backed Coale's plan to ease sanctions in exchange for freed political prisoners. The Kremlin denied any such talks on Sept. 30 but confirmed routine security-service contact on swaps. The last American freed was Robert Gilman in August 2026, and no Ukraine-Russia POW exchange was found for October. The claim of 'great progress,' hostage talks included, isn't supported by any public record. |
| "Signing the document now would drive Russia from the bargaining table" | Mostly False | First, a correction to the first-pass context: the 'document' is not an unsigned bill. Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on Sept. 18, 2026, after the Senate passed it 86-11 on Aug. 7 and the House 262-159 on Sept. 16. On Oct. 16 he signed an executive order waiving its new sanctions and tariffs two days before they took effect, using the act's national-interest certification. 'Signing that document' most plausibly means putting those sanctions into force. The White House said enforcing them 'would impede ongoing U.S. efforts to negotiate' and that the president 'retains the ability to exercise these authorities at any time,' which matches 'I can sign it later' (Time, Euronews, NBC). The prediction itself can't be tested, since the sanctions were waived, but the evidence cuts against it. Russia had already stepped away from the table without them: Putin ruled out resuming talks on Oct. 9, citing drone strikes, not sanctions. Witkoff and Kushner said Putin isn't ready to negotiate, and a Reuters source said he'll return only after taking the rest of Donbas. Signing the act itself on Sept. 18 didn't pull Russia out of talks either. Precedent also points the other way. The Oct. 22, 2025 sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil were followed within days by Dmitriev's Miami talks with Witkoff, which produced the 28-point plan (Axios, CTV). On the other side, Putin envoy Dmitriev called the waiver 'truly historic' and said the package could have stalled US-Russia economic cooperation, so Moscow did weigh it. The forecast is not well supported. |
Overall Veracity: 49%
Post from Truth Social
My decision on Russia is a very simple one. I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don’t want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table. Great progress is being made, and that includes current hostage negotiations! Signing that document at this time will do that, and I can sign it later, or any time that I want! Perhaps more importantly, Russia is doing very little, if anything, to help the Islamic Republic of Iran, compared to what they could be doing, and I want to keep it that way, and will, unless stupid people get in the way. Lastly, Zelenskyy is using Diesel Refineries in Russia as a target, knowing that these attacks are seriously hurting the world diesel markets, including those in the United States. Farmers, ranchers, and businesses of all kinds are suffering greatly from this, but Russia is, nevertheless, sending, at a low price, millions of barrels of diesel to the World. Zelenskyy doesn’t care, and frankly, with all of the money that Europe is famously giving him, and that Crooked Joe Biden gave him in the past, he doesn’t want to end this war, and probably never did. He could have made a better deal two years ago than he can now. His country is in shambles, a large portion of his land is lost, his oceans and seas are gone, and his male population is low, wounded, and/or dead. I WANT THIS WAR END! Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. TRUMP