Video transcript
So, basically, constraining the regime on the budgetary side post-fighting while adding on the blockade basically allows you to weaponize the dollar in a way that you have done damage, particularly to the above-ground solid-propellant ballistic missile production in Iran. And if you squeeze the resources at a time when they otherwise have budgetary issues, they have subsidy issues, it was a failed state pre-war, it was a failed state even pre-protest. Anyway, when you look at the macroeconomic indicators sliding this way, like inflation, for example, in the Islamic Republic, you maximize that, which means you maximize the damage that was done by the kinetics in the previous round of fighting. And if Iran's philosophy is, you mentioned partisan politics, if it's build back better as quickly as possible, some of you may know that bill. Are you saying that the Arabs just hear a bunch of Democrats? I'll let you say that. But if their philosophy is to build back better or to build back faster or to race us to build, these are the tools that actually put time on our side. Because if you marry this powerful financial architecture with what the blockade was able to do-- I mean, just look at the oil exports from February, I think, to May, 2.1 million barrels per day, 1.15 million barrels per day, 900,000 million barrels per day. And then by the time you got to the full month of the blockade after about a half-month of the ceasefire, you had only 64,000 barrels per day. Only four ships got past the US that month before we got into the month that led to the negotiations that got into the MOU. So this will be effective.
Transcribed automatically. Expect errors in names and numbers.